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Abstract 
In Finland, especially in central governmental and municipal sector, collective pay agreements make it 
possible to use—and even require—job evaluation and individual performance appraisals to determine 
employee base pay levels. These practices are generally designed to enhance pay satisfaction and the 
motivation of the current workforce, as well as to attract and retain skilled work force. This dissertation 
provides new insights into the psychological mechanisms that explain why employees adopt certain 
attitudes and behaviors in response to merit pay reforms, often referred to as incentive effects in the 
literature on compensation psychology. The dissertation summarizes five studies that draw upon 
different theoretical perspectives and concepts, including psychophysics, affective events theory, 
reflection theory, organizational politics and fairness. Each study contributes to our understanding of 
how merit pay in particular influences attitudes and behaviors of the existing workforce. The data were 
gathered from seven public sector organizations in Finland via employee surveys (sample size totals N= 
1350 for all the studies). We used records-based pay data from five of the seven organizations. 
Based on the results, I argue that pay increases of less than eight percent might not be meaningfully 
noticed. However, employees are comparatively more sensitive to negative pay changes such as indirect 
pay cuts. The results suggest that organizations should be aware that employees react to pay reforms 
affectively depending in part on how the reform personally impacts their pay, and these affective 
reactions may influence attitudes and behaviors at work. I argue that employee acceptance of merit pay 
practices depends on their understanding of why the system is being implemented and accepting these 
reasons in such a way that the pay system transmits positive symbolic and instrumental messages. 
Managers can have a positive impact on pay system success through participatory goal-setting processes 
and by creating trusting relationships where subordinates perceive performance appraisals as fair. The 
results imply that for a pay system to be effective, it is essential for employees to believe that politics do 
not play a part in performance appraisals and pay decisions. If employees believe that pay decisions are 
based on politics instead of performance, the organization risks having not only an ineffective pay 
system but one that produces undesirable outcomes. The results also suggest that employee participation 
in pay system development only matters when employees believe that managers’ actions are sincere.  
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Tiivistelmä 
Suomessa työehtosopimukset etenkin julkisella sektorilla ovat mahdollistaneet ja määritelleet, että työn 
vaativuuden ja työsuorituksen arviointiin perustuvat palkkausjärjestelmät korvaavat A-
virkapalkkajärjestelmät ja niihin liittyvät ikälisät. Palkkausuudistusten keskeisiä tavoitteita ovat olleet 
henkilöstön palkkatyytyväisyyden parantaminen, työmotivaation ja sitoutumisen lisääminen sekä 
esimiestyön tukeminen. Väitöskirja tarjoaa uusia näkökulmia aiheeseen psykologisten teorioiden avulla, 
jotka selittävät miten etenkin suorituksen arviointiin perustuvat palkkausjärjestelmät vaikuttavat 
henkilöstön asenteisiin ja käyttäytymiseen työpaikalla. Väitöskirjan tulokset tarkentavat ja täydentävät 
nykykäsitystä suorituksen arviointiin perustuvan palkkauksen keskeisistä soveltamishaasteista ja -
mahdollisuuksista. Työn sisältö perustuu viiteen osajulkaisuun. Tutkimusaineisto kerättiin seitsemästä 
suomalaisesta julkisen sektorin organisaatiosta pääosin henkilöstökyselyjen avulla (yhteenlaskettu 
otoskoko N=1350). Näistä viidessä organisaatiossa kerättiin myös palkkatietoja tuplasokkomenetelmän 
avulla.  
Tutkimuksessa havaittiin, että palkkausuudistus herätti sekä kielteisiä että myönteisiä tunteita, jotka osin 
riippuvat siitä, miten uudistus vaikutti omaan palkkaan. Tunnereaktiot puolestaan osin selittivät, miten 
palkkausuudistus vaikutti asenteisiin ja käyttäytymiseen työpaikalla. Palkankorotukset, jotka olivat alle 
kahdeksan prosenttia, eivät tulosten mukaan olleet merkittäviä henkilöstölle. Henkilöstö reagoi 
kuitenkin herkemmin prosentuaalisesti pienempään takuupalkkaan. Tutkimuksen mukaan on tärkeää, 
että henkilöstö ymmärtää, mitkä palkkausjärjestelmän tavoitteet ovat. Palkkausjärjestelmä koettiin 
merkitykselliseksi ja siihen oltiin tyytyväisempiä, jos henkilöstö koki sen kautta saavansa palautetta 
työstään. Esimiehet voivat vaikuttaa myönteisesti palkkausjärjestelmän toimivuuteen osallistavalla 
tavoitteiden asettamisella, joka perustuu luottamukseen. Jotta suorituksen arviointiin perustuva palkkaus 
vaikuttaisi myönteisesti henkilöstön toimintaan, on tärkeää, ettei suoritusarvioiden ja niiden perusteella 
tehtävien palkkapäätösten koeta määräytyvän poliittisten agendojen perusteella henkilöstön 
suoriutumisen sijaan. Epäluottamus palkkapäätösten perusteiden tarkoitusperistä saattaa vaikuttaa 
kielteisesti henkilöstön toimintaan. 
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toimintaan  
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1. Introduction 
Compensation has been studied from many different perspectives, including those based in 
organizational behavior, organizational theory, international management, 
industrial/organizational psychology, sociology, economics, labor economics, law, and 
strategy, among others. Recently, Werner and Ward (2004) conducted an eclectic review of 
compensation-related articles published from 1996 to 2002 in the 20 top management journals. 
They used Milkovich and Newman’s definition of compensation (2002): ‘‘all forms of financial 
returns and tangible services and benefits employees receive as part of an employment 
relationship.’’ Werner and Ward (2004) categorized compensation research into 12 areas:  
1) Environmental determinants of compensation  
2) Firm determinants of compensation 
3) Job and group determinants of compensation  
4) Gender and race determinants of compensation  
5) Individual determinants of compensation 
6) Individual outcomes of compensation  
7) Compensation psychology  
8) Organizational justice  
9) Firm outcomes of compensation  
10) Benefits 
11) International compensation   
12) Executive compensation. 
This dissertation provides new insights into the literature Werner and Ward (2004) referred as 
to “compensation psychology,” which includes research on pay satisfaction, motivation, the 
meaning of money, and psychological reactions to compensation. One of the four topics they 
cite as receiving little attention so far is employee satisfaction with and reactions to changes in 
compensation plans. More specifically, there are few midrange theories that foster our 
understanding of the mechanisms through which return-on-investment on pay system reforms 
could be improved (R. L. Heneman, 2000a). Heneman (2000a) argues that while there is an 
increasing body of knowledge showing that compensation practices hold great potential for 
motivating employees, we know relatively little about why the pay systems work the way they 
do and under what conditions they work best. Following this call for research, this dissertation 
explores the psychological mechanisms that explain why employees adopt certain attitudes and 
2 Psychological mechanisms explaining merit pay acceptance and effectiveness 
behavioral responses to merit pay reforms—often referred to as incentive effects in the 
literature on compensation (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005). 
This dissertation studies employee attitudes and behaviors towards one form of employee 
compensation—broadly called pay-for-performance and, more specifically, merit pay. Merit 
pay is defined here as a form of base pay determined by a performance appraisal of an 
individual employee (R. L. Heneman, 1992). In this dissertation, I argue that research on the 
effects of merit pay on employee attitudes and behaviors is important and necessary for at least 
two reasons:  
1) In practical terms, this is an under researched area compared to its popularity. Ongoing 
changes in the labor market are pushing local and global organizations alike to 
implement pay-for-performance practices, one of the most prevalent being merit pay.  
2) We have an incomplete theoretical understanding of the psychological mechanisms 
through which merit pay practices influence employee attitudes and behaviors.  
I also argue that the main challenges with pay-for-performance systems are related to these two 
factors: 
1) Acceptance of the plan by employees 
2) Effectiveness of the compensation system to promote desired attitudes and behaviors, 
and achieving broader organizational goals, such as strategy implementation and 
enhanced productivity.  
The notion of acceptance captures employees’ attitudes towards the pay system. I believe these 
attitudes may or may not be associated with employee actions and organization-level outcomes. 
I argue that we can understand more about the effectiveness of merit pay practices by studying 
the indirect effects of merit pay on employee attitudes and behaviors in the workplace. Further, 
I argue that since organizations implement pay systems with certain goals in mind, asking 
employees how the goals of the reform are achieved can provide information on the success of 
a given pay reform. The introduction to this dissertation builds on these arguments. 
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1.1 The Prevalence of Merit Pay Practices 
Three overarching themes characterize the debate over compensation systems in Europe, the 
US and Japan (Sparrow, 2004). First, there is a shift from job- to person-based human resources 
practices; a trend that deviates from the historical patterns of wage structure. Second, 
governments are transferring social costs and risks away from organizations and the state to the 
individual. Third, there are significant threats to the psychological contract, and the reward-
effort bargain is becoming more fragmented and individualized. I argue that all these trends 
have implications for pay-for-performance practices (refer also to Salimäki & Heneman, 2008).  
The first trend reflects a shift from looking at the job as a basis for compensation to focusing on 
desired skills, knowledge and competencies of individual employees (Klaas, 2002). Employee 
compensation costs resulting from the transition to knowledge-based occupations are high and 
will continue to escalate. Organizations have to know whether their compensation practices 
support achieving strategic objectives. This trend derives from a strategic approach to 
managing pay that is becoming increasingly common in organizations throughout the world (R. 
L. Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 2000). Researchers have used various terms to describe the 
trend: strategic pay (Lawler, 1990), new pay (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992) and performance-
based pay (R. L. Heneman & Gresham, 1998). In addition to merit pay practices, variable pay 
systems and group-based and/or company-wide performance- or results-based pay plans now 
supplement base pay systems to tie employee efforts more tightly to organization strategy. 
These new forms of pay often require individualized pay negotiations and result in greater 
differentiation in pay levels within the organization.  
The second trend reflects a shift from institutional isomorphism to competitive isomorphism in 
the global economy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The trend generates more coherent pay 
structures in multinational corporations but at the same time leads to insecurity over income 
and thus the value attached to immediate financial rewards for employees. Currently, 
multinationals are evenly split between centralized (i.e., globally integrated) and decentralized 
(i.e., locally responsive) approaches to their global compensation structure (49 percent 
centralized vs. 51 percent decentralized) (WorldatWork & WatsonWyattWorldwide, 2004). 
However, there is a growing trend toward greater centralization in the near term in order to 
have a consistent link between rewards and results and a consistent position in relation to the 
market and internal equity.  
4 Psychological mechanisms explaining merit pay acceptance and effectiveness 
The third trend highlights a decentralized collective bargaining process (with an increase in 
company-level bargaining) that has lent a strong impetus to the spread of pay-for-performance. 
When a firm uses pay-for-performance, employees desire local bargaining to have a larger role 
in wage contracts (Heikkilä & Piekkola, 2005). As a result of these trends, pay-for- 
performance practices are not only becoming more prevalent, but also preferred by employees. 
Indeed, research shows that employees are generally accepting systems of rewards based on 
their performance. For example, according to a study on pay criteria preferences, Hong Kong 
and Australian employees rated performance as the most preferred criterion, and Indonesian 
and Malaysian employee samples rated it the second most preferred criterion after 
responsibility (Mamman, Sulaiman, & Fadel, 1996). Another study showed extensive 
agreement among bank employees from Canada, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom and Finland 
on what criteria should determine rewards (Chiang & Birtch, 2005). They ranked performance 
as the most important criterion, closely followed by human capital (e.g. skills, experience and 
education) and job inputs (e.g. responsibility, workload, effort). These results, and others, 
indicate that employees typically accept the principle of compensation for performance. 
Pay-for-performance plans reward certain sets of behaviors or the results of those behaviors on 
an individual or collective level via a diverse set of technical solutions (see Table 1 for a 
categorization of the types of pay-for-performance plans). This dissertation studies employee 
attitudes and behaviors in organizations that have recently implemented a particular type of 
pay-for-performance, called merit pay. Merit pay is defined here as a form of base pay that 
reflects the performance appraisal of an individual employee (R. L. Heneman, 1992), just as 
individual incentives do. However, incentives differ from merit pay because they are variable, 
not a fixed part of base pay. Note that incentives and other variable forms of pay often mean 
that employees incur more risk with their pay, which could precipitate different kinds of 
psychological reactions (e.g. Deckop, Merriman, & Blau, 2004). Individual-level pay-for-
performance is often contrasted with collective forms of pay-for-performance, which may 
produce a different set of psychological and behavioral reactions (such as social loafing, or 
free-riding) resulting from work interdependence (see for example Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 
2002). All forms of pay-for-performance can be contrasted with flat-rate percentage increases 
for all employees based on market conditions (e.g. cost-of-living adjustments) or pay increases 
based on seniority (e.g. years of service, rank, status) of the employee. 
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Table 1.  Pay-for-performance practices come in many forms (Salimäki & Heneman, 2008, p. 
159) 
  Individual Collective 
Fixed Merit pay 
Skill- or competency-based 
pay 
Promotion 
  
Variable Payment by results  
Piece-rate pay 
Commissions  
Bonuses  
Individual incentives 
Performance-related pay  
Financial participation 
Gain-, goal-, and profit 
sharing 
Ownership  
Group incentives 
 
In Finland, there is a strong trend towards adopting different forms of pay-for-performance, 
especially in the public sector where collective pay agreements now make it possible to use—
and even require—job evaluation and individual performance appraisals to determine base pay 
levels. Although collective bargaining agreements continue to be nearly universal in Finland, 
the shift toward these practices is based on several strategic grounds, including enhancing the 
reputation of employer, providing more attractive career paths and opportunities for employees, 
and improving organizational performance (The State Audit Office, 2002). The political agenda 
of the Ministry of Labor specifically emphasizes that the new pay systems aim “to promote fair 
salaries, to improve salary competitiveness, to support staff in developing their skills and in 
seeking more demanding tasks, to encourage staff to perform better and to develop, and to 
improve leadership and leadership skills” (collective agreement for state civil servants and 
employees under contract 2005, §1). According to the Ministry of Labor, these aims are best 
advanced by implementing pay systems based on job evaluation and performance appraisals 
instead of distributing across-the-board increases to all employees.  
Since 1994, organizations within the central government in Finland have been implementing 
new pay systems. Especially after 2004, implementation has been centrally enforced, and many 
governmental organizations agreed with employee representatives on the implementation of 
new systems. The governmental organizations had traditionally granted pay increases to 
employees based on their seniority levels and promotions (i.e., job title). In recent years, 
because of these reforms, the criteria used to determine pay increases have shifted from 
seniority to job content, performance and competence of the employee. Almost all (97.6 %; 
115 150) employees in the central government sector were covered by new pay systems based 
6 Psychological mechanisms explaining merit pay acceptance and effectiveness 
on job evaluation and performance appraisals as of January 2007 (Ministry of Finance, 2007). 
The same trend applies to the municipal sector and has been evident for an even longer time in 
the private sector (Hakonen, Salimäki, & Hulkko, 2005).  
Structurally, the public sector pay systems typically consist of three parts: job-based pay, merit 
pay and, in some instances, guaranteed pay. Job-based pay corresponds to the job evaluation 
score an employee and supervisor agree to. The value of the job scores are negotiated between 
employer and employee representatives. Job-based pay is a relatively stable portion of overall 
pay. Regular (usually yearly) performance appraisals serve as a basis for the merit pay portion 
of salary (that may consist of up to 50% on top of job-based pay). Under the reform policy, the 
proposed new pay levels based on job evaluation and performance appraisal have been smaller 
for some employees in comparison to their old pay levels. To enhance the acceptability of the 
pay reform, the pay levels based on the old system have been guaranteed (collective agreement 
for state civil servants and employees under contract, 2005, §8) so that pay cuts would not 
occur as long as the person stays with the same employer, typically in the same position. 
However, the pay guarantee has implications for the future pay prospects of the employee, 
since in order to get a merit increase, the person would have to first catch up with the 
performance expectations required for the level of pay guarantee (i.e., previously earned pay 
level), and then exceed those.  
In sum, there clearly is a “push” towards the use of pay-for-performance practices, especially 
merit pay as part of total compensation, for several reasons. However, the question remains 
whether these systems actually promote acceptability (satisfaction) and effectiveness (such as 
increased effort and organizational goal attainment) and under what conditions. Knowing the 
conditions necessary for acceptability and effectiveness might help us improve the return-on-
investment of employee merit pay practices (R. L. Heneman, 2000a). As employees are 
commonly more dissatisfied with how their pay is determined rather than with their pay level, 
much needs to be done to make compensation practices more acceptable and effective 
(LeBlanc & Mulvey, 1998).  
The next section contains a brief overview of some of the major psychological theories that 
explain how and why merit pay can be acceptable and effective. 
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1.2 Theory Supporting the Use of Merit Pay 
There is a large body of research with a psychological foundation that encourages the use of 
merit pay and other forms of pay for individual performance. This reasoning contends that pay 
systems contingent on performance have great potential to be powerful motivators. Several 
meta-analyses have documented that performance-contingent pay systems have a substantial 
impact on employee performance (Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; for a review, see 
Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005). In contrast, theories claiming that pay is a hygiene factor 
(motivation-hygiene theory by Herzberg, 1987) or at the low end of the needs hierarchy 
(hierarchy of needs by Maslow, 1943), are not adequately supported by empirical research 
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, pp. 48-54; Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005). Instead, the research 
seems to support the notion that pay has a larger impact on employees’ work than they 
acknowledge (Heath, 1999; Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2004).  
Several complementary psychological theories (Bartol & Locke, 2000), such as expectancy 
theory, goal setting theory and equity theory, relate pay-for-performance to employee 
motivation and performance. Perhaps the best-known theory in psychology that promotes the 
use of merit pay is expectancy theory, which has been extensively researched (for reviews, see 
Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). The theory, first presented by Vroom 
(1964), consists of three components: expectancy, instrumentality and valence. Expectancy 
refers to estimating how much effort is needed to achieve a certain level of performance. 
Instrumentality is a belief in the existing link between performance and outcomes such as pay 
and promotion. Valence is the attractiveness of these outcomes to the individual. Employee 
motivation is highest when the individual believes that his/her behavior will lead to certain 
outcomes, when he/she feels that these outcomes are attractive, and that performance at the 
desired level is possible. According to expectancy theory, merit pay may motivate individuals 
when performance is accurately measured, pay is valued as an outcome, the relationship 
between pay and performance is clearly defined and there are opportunities to improve 
performance (R. L. Heneman & Werner, 2006, pp. 25-27). Merit pay is not likely to motivate if 
one does not value the reward, if one does not believe that one can perform well, or that one 
will get what one deserves. 
Another highly influential theory in motivation research is goal-setting theory, which describes 
the importance of goals to work motivation (Latham & Pinder, 2005). According to the theory, 
challenging, specific and acceptable goals are related to higher levels of effort and persistence 
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on the job (Locke & Latham, 1990). Specific goals also narrow attention and direct efforts to 
goal-relevant activities and away from undesirable and goal-irrelevant actions. Goal-setting 
theory suggests that pay affects behavior through its influence on acceptance of challenging, 
specific work goals and maintaining commitment to them. Thus, merit pay motivates an 
individual to set more difficult goals and promotes commitment to those goals (R. L. Heneman 
& Werner, 2006, pp. 32-33). Merit pay also promotes better overall performance because 
specific goals direct employee effort to relevant tasks. Merit increases, according to this theory, 
must be contingent on specific rather than "do your best" goals and should be based on goal 
difficulty. If goal difficulty is not factored into rewards, employees may be motivated to set 
lower goals because they are easier to accomplish and employees can still get rewarded. Goals, 
weights for each goal, and merit increases should all be discussed at the same time to have the 
desired motivational effect.  
One of the key challenges with compensation is to match it with employee perceptions of what 
is fair. Employees usually like the idea of being compensated for their performance (i.e., pay 
equity) rather than equally distributed rewards, or distribution according to employee need 
(e.g., Chen, 1995). For this reason, perceptions of whether there is alignment between pay and 
performance (R. L. Heneman, Greenberger, & Strasser, 1988) and perceived pay equity 
(distributive justice, c.f. Colquitt, 2001) are both highly associated with pay satisfaction 
(Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006). In addition, feelings of stress and poor health (for 
review, see Van Vegchel, de Jonge, Bosma, & Schaufeli, 2005) may result from an imbalance 
between work effort and rewards. Equity theory (Adams, 1965) explains these responses, 
contending that employees want to be rewarded in accordance with their performance.  
According to equity theory, employees decide what their equitable return should be after 
comparing their inputs and outcomes with those of their co-workers. Inequity (i.e., when a 
person does not get what he thinks he deserves) creates a sense of psychological tension or 
distress that motivates individuals to restore balance. Employees who see their compensation 
as inequitable may seek to reduce the inequity by distorting inputs and/or outcomes in their 
own minds, by directly altering inputs and/or outputs on the job, or by leaving the organization. 
Research supports the aspect of the theory that finds a sense of underpayment creating tension 
in employees (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, pp. 135-138). For example, if pay is not perceived as 
equitable, employees may leave the organization (Roth, 2006). More specifically, those 
individuals who perform at a high level are most likely to leave an organization if their 
performance does not lead to sufficient compensation (Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997), but 
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those with average and low performance are more likely to stay if the relationship between pay 
and performance is weak (Harrison, Virick, & William, 1996; Shaw & Gupta, 2007). Equity 
theory has implications for merit pay (R. L. Heneman & Werner, 2006, pp. 29-31) since it 
suggests that merit pay decisions cannot be viewed in isolation because employees compare 
their inputs and outputs. To avoid incorrect assessments on the ratio of outcomes to inputs, 
inputs must be clearly defined and managers must communicate the merit pay practice to 
employees to avoid incorrect assumptions about the relationship between pay and performance.  
This dissertation builds on the theories that assume employees consider pay for performance 
important. It is based on psychological theories that explain why and how pay systems, 
especially merit pay practices, impact employee attitudes and behaviors. This work is in many 
ways based on the literature on expectancy, goal-setting and equity theory that has dominated 
research in this area for decades. Sounds good in theory, what about practice? 
 The next section presents a brief overview of the literature that draws attention to the possible 
challenges with merit pay. 
 
1.3 The Merit Pay Dilemma 
Despite the popularity of merit pay practices, and the extensive research support for the 
principle of paying for individual performance, researchers are troubled by the fact that merit 
pay seems to work inconsistently (e.g., R. L. Heneman, 1992). Over two thirds of the 63 
international human resource managers who responded to a reward-and-recognition survey in 
2005 aimed at applying a pay-for-performance philosophy internationally (Perskins, 2006) but 
fewer than half said they were able to apply the concept in practice. Only about one-fourth of 
those surveyed believed that rewards are always linked to performance appraisals in employee 
perception. This result suggests that even if organizations have a pay-for-performance policy, it 
does not always succeed in practice. Employees perceive the policy as successful even less 
often.  
Practitioners have encountered various implementation problems that hamper the acceptance 
and effectiveness of merit pay, including difficulty in creating measures for individual 
performance in interdependent work contexts, problems getting supervisors to provide credible 
assessments of performance for administrative purposes, and limited pay budgets available for 
merit increases because of an annuity effect (for a discussion, see Beer & Cannon, 2004; 
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Campbell, Campbell, & Chia, 1998; Perry, Engbers, & Jun, 2008). These and other 
implementation problems create a typically weak link between performance and pay increases 
(for e review, see R. L. Heneman, 1990), suggesting that merit pay does not always motivate 
employees just because organizations fail to differentiate between high and low performers 
(Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). Thus, even though most employees want to be compensated 
based on their performance and managers support the principle of rewarding employee 
contributions, the same employees and managers can be very suspicious about whether the a 
merit pay system has any motivational value in practice (e.g., L. Harris, 2001; Marsden & 
Richardson, 1994). 
Multiple studies on US federal government merit pay practices in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, 
have demonstrated that merit pay seemed to have little impact on employee motivation and 
organizational performance because of difficulties with the performance appraisal process and 
insufficient resources to establish a viable system (for a review, see Kellough & Lu, 1993). 
Kellough and Lu (1993) conclude that in the public sector:  
• Goals and performance criteria are often diverse, conflicting and difficult to measure.  
• Credibility issues exist with supervisory ratings, such as rater leniency (tendency to 
inflate ratings in order to avoid conflict) and halo effect (tendency to give the same 
rating on all performance aspects) when standard criteria are missing.  
• Merit pay invites political intrusion because performance appraisal cannot be done 
objectively. Public sector managers are often chosen for their neutral competence, and 
may not have the discretion and skills necessary to apply merit pay practices.  
• Because of a budget neutrality policy, pay increases even for outstanding performers 
have been low. This has caused managers to complain that the amount of paperwork 
and effort required were not worth the small merit increases allowed for employees.  
• Finally, Kellough and Lu state that merit pay practices may not be effective for public 
sector employees since they are not primarily concerned with their pay, but with other 
aspects of the job5.  
                                                 
5 Researchers have debated whether external rewards are detrimental to intrinsic motivation (i.e., 
motivation to carry out the activity because of pure interest; see cognitive evaluation theory by Deci & 
Ryan, 1985). Two meta-analyses on the issue (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; see also Cameron & Pierce, 
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Many practitioners and academics alike believe that organizations waste a significant amount 
of money on compensation systems because they end up “hoping for A while rewarding for B” 
(Kerr, 1995). Thus, organizations might end up wasting money because the compensation 
system motivates not-hoped-for behaviors (Kohn, 1993). A classic example of this would be 
when an organization verbally supports collaboration but only rewards for individual 
performance. Consequently, employees may focus on their job goals so intently that they do not 
have as much time or desire to help others (Wright, George, Farnsworth, & McMahan, 1993) or 
support the organization’s long-term goals. 
Pfeffer (1998), one of the critical voices contributing to the discourse, has argued that 
individual pay-for-performance undermines teamwork, encourages a short-term focus, and 
leads people to believe that pay is not related to performance at all but to having the “right” 
relationships and an ingratiating personality. He states that pay-for-performance undermines 
employees’ loyalty and performance by fostering their sense of being controlled. Finally, he 
notes that “the time and attention spent managing the reward system are not available to 
devote to other aspects of the work environment that in the end may be much more critical to 
success” (p.117).  
The literature reflects a dilemma on merit pay: When merit pay works the way it should, it can 
be highly acceptable and effective. But when it does not work as planned it can be unsatisfying 
and produce unintended consequences. Overall, pay is an important cost and often a problem 
because people are commonly unsatisfied with it (Lawler, 1981). Because pay is an important 
cost, organizations cannot afford to have systems that reward for B while they are hoping for A. 
Furthermore, if those in power breach of the psychological contract are not paying a fair rate, it 
can rapidly cause disillusionment, dissatisfaction, and exit (Rousseau, 2004). Literature 
suggests that if performance differences are obvious and measurable but unrewarded, high-
performing individuals may leave or lose motivation (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, p. 260).  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
1996; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) came to different conclusions. The contemporary formulations of 
self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), partly as a result, suggest that extrinsic motivation can 
vary in the degree to which it is autonomous versus controlled. According to this view, when rewards 
are administered in an autonomy-supportive climate, they are less likely to undermine intrinsic 
motivation and, in some cases, can enhance intrinsic motivation. So far, little research has examined 
whether rewards can support autonomous motivation (Gagne & Deci, 2005). The controversy remains 
whether and under what circumstances rewards enhance or undermine intrinsic motivation. 
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2. Aims and Research Questions 
Despite advances in psychological theories such as expectancy, goal-setting and equity theory 
in providing helpful guidelines to identify challenges with merit pay, the theories are too 
general (Bartol & Locke, 2000) to address the dilemma organizations  face in paying people in 
a way that is acceptable and effective. Since we do not fully understand why merit pay systems 
work the way they do and under what conditions they work best, researchers need to develop 
theories further on how employees perceive and react to merit pay (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 
2005).  
I adopt a psychological perspective in approaching this challenge for two reasons: First, I 
assume that the there is more value to money than just its absolute value. Secondly, I assume 
that understanding individuals’ reactions to pay is crucial in explaining why pay systems work 
on some occasions but not on others. The psychological view emphasizes that managers may 
find it impossible to truly optimize performance if they fail to account for both individual and 
contextual differences in pursuing high effectiveness in pay systems (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, 
pp. 120-123).  
Werner and Ward (2004) include research on employee reactions to compensation such as pay 
satisfaction, motivation and the meaning of money in their definition of compensation 
psychology. This dissertation contributes to each of these areas and advances the field by 
introducing theoretical perspectives that broaden our understanding of why employees adopt 
certain attitudes and behavioral responses to merit pay reforms. The dissertation consists of 
five studies that draw on different theoretical perspectives for answers to the following research 
questions: 
1) How do reactions to positive pay changes compare with negative changes resulting 
from merit pay implementation? 
2) How does a pay reform influence employee behaviors and attitudes? 
3) What are the psychological mechanisms that explain employee pay satisfaction?  
4) How can managers contribute to employees’ perceptions of merit pay system success?  
5) What makes people believe (or not believe) that a merit pay system is effective? 
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By seeking answers to these questions, the aim is to complement our current understanding of 
the psychological mechanisms that explain how merit pay influences the attitudes and 
behaviors of the existing workforce, often called incentive effects in the literature (Gerhart & 
Rynes, 2003; Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005) (see Chart 1).  
 
 
Psychological mechanisms
Incentive effects
Merit pay outcomes
 
Chart 1. The research focuses on the psychological mechanisms that explain incentive effects 
on the individual level.  
 
This dissertation will not compare different choices organizations can make in terms of merit 
pay structure and implementation. Research on the types of individuals attracted and retained 
(i.e., sorting effects) would require organization-level study designs (for example, see Shaw & 
Gupta, 2007), and this is not in the scope of this dissertation. Instead, the dissertation focuses 
on individual-level variation in how employees perceive merit pay practices and their attitudes 
and behaviors concerning pay level and pay changes in connection with the policy. In the 
conclusion of the dissertation, I discuss how the existing research informs merit pay 
implementation in practice. 
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3. Research Approach and Methods 
A good research problem should generate new information and be based on strong theory that 
can be tested (Sutton & Staw, 1995). According to the positivistic ideal the research problem 
has to be based on testable theory and the chain of assumptions behind the theory should be 
logically clarified.  
The three central assumptions in my research are:  
1) Pay is important to people and its impact on attitudes, behaviors and organizational goal 
attainment can be explained by different psychological mechanisms that inform 
management practice (theoretical assumptions). 
2) Cross-sectional variation in plan acceptance and effectiveness among individuals is 
interesting (assumption related to research design).  
3) Psychological mechanisms as well as plan acceptance and effectiveness can be 
measured using a survey (assumption related to methodology).  
The first assumption, as it is theoretical in nature, is founded in the theoretical discourse 
presented in the introduction section and throughout the dissertation. Each of the studies 
focuses on employee attitudes and behaviors, either directly stemming from merit pay practice, 
or as distal outcomes of the compensation practice. We conducted the studies in seven Finnish 
public sector organizations that had recently implemented new pay systems partly based on 
performance appraisals (i.e., merit pay). The data were gathered during 2003-2007. The 
response rates varied between 34 and 60 percent (see Table 1). Each study gathered data to 
answer the respective research question.  
Appendices I-V contain detailed descriptions of the data collection procedures used in each 
study. We used structured established survey methods to study cross-sectional individual-level 
variation in merit pay acceptance and effectiveness. Data on merit pay were in most cases 
gathered separately from psychological mechanisms and incentive effects. Specifically, 
records-based pay data were gathered from five organizations out of seven. The pay data were 
linked to survey data using a double-blind procedure. Inferences from psychological 
mechanisms to incentive effects were primarily drawn from employee survey data based on 
established survey methods where possible. The survey scales were pilot-tested to ensure that 
translation would not have an impact on the interpretation of the items. Information on the 
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validity and reliability of the survey scales can be found in the articles (Appendixes I-V). 
Cross-sectional variance in employee acceptance and merit pay effectiveness were analyzed 
primarily using regression analysis (in SPSS 16.0), and structural equation modeling (in Amos 
16 and Lisrel 8.53).  
 
Table 1. Description of the data 
Study Organization/s Data 
1 and 2 Two governmental 
organizations 
Employee survey data (n1=247; RR=49%, 
n2=248; RR=50%), and pay data from before and 
after the reform for all of the employees 
3 One municipal organization  Employee survey data (n3=371; RR=46%) 
4 One governmental 
organization 
Employee survey data (n4=109; RR=60%) 
5 Three governmental 
organizations 
Employee survey data (n5=157; RR=48%, 
n6=109; RR=39%, n7=109; RR=34%), and pay 
data from before and after the reform for all of 
the employees 
In total Seven public sector 
organizations 
Employee survey data N=1350 and pay data 
N=870 
Notes. RR = response rate 
 
3.1 Explication of the Contribution 
In accordance with university guidelines, I now explicate my personal contribution to the 
research publication process. All data were gathered in research projects funded by external 
parties. The descriptive information on the results was first reported to organizations where the 
data were gathered and/or the financiers of the project. Then we analyzed the data for academic 
publication purposes.  
The first and second articles are based on the same data set from two governmental 
organizations. The idea for the article in Appendix I first emerged in discussions with Jason D. 
Shaw and Atul Mitra. As the first author, Atul Mitra wrote an initial draft and conducted the 
data analysis. I participated in the writing and revision of the article, including a number of 
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drafts, with Jason D. Shaw. The supportive feedback from the Department of Industrial 
Engineering and Management Working Paper Series editor Satu Teerikangas influenced the 
final version of the article. 
As the first author of the second article, in Appendix II, I conceived the research question, 
planned the data gathering, and conducted the statistical analyses. The writing was a joint effort 
with Robert B. Lount, Jr. During the multiple drafts of the paper, we benefited from discussions 
with and feedback from Neal Ashkanasy, Joe Cooper, Robert L. Heneman, Raymond Noe, Satu 
Teerikangas and Steffanie Wilk.  
For the article in Appendix III, the data were gathered in a project with Anu Hakonen. As the 
first author, I planned the article framework, conducted the statistical analysis, wrote an initial 
version of the article and revised the paper. Anu Hakonen and Robert L. Heneman provided 
feedback on the writing. Feedback from two anonymous reviewers of Journal of Managerial 
Psychology and the editor, Dianna L. Stone, as well as Jason D. Shaw and Erin Coyne 
influenced the final version. 
The fourth article, in Appendix IV, is based on my Master’s thesis in psychology (completed in 
2004). As the first author, I conceived the idea for the research, planned the research process, 
carried out data gathering, conducted statistical testing and wrote an initial version of the 
article. Pertti Keskivaara provided guidance on how to properly conduct structural equation 
modeling. Kiisa Hulkko, Göte Nyman and Anna Ylikorkala provided feedback on the writing. 
Feedback from two anonymous reviewers of Journal of Finnish Psychological Society, and the 
editor, influenced the final version. 
For the final article, in Appendix V, Sini Jämsén and I utilized data that was already gathered 
by my co-author along with her colleagues Mari Huuhtanen, Katriina Karkulehto, Virpi 
Karppinen, and Carita Lahti. As the first author, I planned the article framework and conducted 
the statistical analysis. Sini Jämsén participated in the writing as a second author. One version 
of the article was presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management in August 
2007. I had valuable discussions with Professor Jason D. Shaw about later drafts of the article. 
Feedback from Chad Brinsfield, two anonymous reviewers as well as the editors Shay Tzafrir 
and Dianna L. Stone of the Journal of Managerial Psychology influenced revisions of the 
article.  
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4. Results 
In this section, I briefly introduce the main results of each dissertation study.  
 
4.1 Just Noticeable Differences in Pay Changes: Psychophysics in Pay 
Psychophysical theories seek to understand the relationship among stimulus intensities, 
sensations, and associated processes (Gescheider, 1976; Gescheider & Bolanowski, 1991; 
Upshaw, 1974). Weber’s law of psychophysics provides the basis for establishing thresholds 
when individuals notice a difference in stimulus. This growing literature provides support for 
the applicability of Weber’s law in understanding employees’ perceptions of pay changes. Just 
as individuals have a threshold for noticing changes in other stimuli (e.g., the brightness of light 
or the loudness of sound); the point where individuals begin to react to their pay raises has been 
termed the “just noticeable difference” in pay (Mitra, Gupta, & Jenkins, 1997). It is based on 
the idea that small pay increases are not met with negative reactions but instead they go 
essentially unnoticed (e.g., see Katkowski, Medsker, & Pritchard, 2002, for a review).  
RQ 1: How do reactions to positive pay changes compare with negative changes in pay 
resulting from merit pay implementation? 
The first article (Appendix I) found that the pay thresholds for positive changes in pay were 8.4 
percent for behavioral intent and from 7.2 to 9.7 percent for positive affective reactions. These 
estimates are very close to estimates using the successive categories approach in Mitra et al.’s 
(1997) laboratory study (around 7 percent) and Mitra et al.’s (2002) field study (around 6 
percent). Indeed, Mitra and his colleagues suggest pay raises in the range of 7 to 10 percent as a 
practical guideline. Our results in a very divergent context fall squarely within this range.  
The notion of a pay change threshold has so far been applied only to pay increases or positive 
pay changes. According to prospect theory, employees usually pay more attention to losses 
than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). This phenomenon is often referred as to loss 
aversion, which results in a utility function that is steeper for losses than for gains (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Loss aversion implies that someone who loses $100 will be more 
dissatisfied than someone with a $100 windfall will be notably satisfied. The study assessed 
just noticeable differences for implied pay cuts (i.e., how employees reacted to guaranteed 
pay), one of its key contributions. We found that the pay thresholds for negative pay changes 
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were -5.7 percent for effort and varied from -6.8 to -3.9 for different negative affective 
reactions. The thresholds were constantly smaller for negative pay changes than for positive 
pay changes. We thus concluded that people experience loss aversion, a greater sensitivity to 
losses than to gains, in response even to implied pay cuts.  
Our post hoc analysis revealed that positive affective responses were primarily associated with 
factors employees had some control over. Conversely, the negative affective reactions to 
implied pay cuts were associated with external attributions – but also demonstrated a more 
complex pattern. A negative affective reaction, “afraid,” was significantly correlated with 
attribution to the trade union influence. Affect “hostility” was significantly correlated with 
attribution to the group that oversaw the process of consistent application (a group of employee 
and employer representatives whose task was to ensure that the system was applied 
consistently). Finally, affect “nervous” was significantly correlated with attribution to the 
organizational-level decision-making. Thus, our post hoc analysis suggests that with negative 
pay changes, the respondents’ emotional experience varied among the different attributions. 
The study thus demonstrates three factors that play into employees’ reactions to pay changes in 
reforms: 
1)  Below a certain threshold, employees did not react meaningfully (such as 
demonstrating higher effort on the job or positive affective reactions) to pay increases. 
2) Because of loss aversion, employees are more sensitive to even implied negative 
changes in their pay (i.e., guaranteed pay) than positive changes (i.e., pay increases). 
3) Attributions will probably be a factor in how employees react to pay changes. 
According to this study, positive affective reactions were related to attributions of the 
pay change being caused by factors employees had some control over. Conversely, 
negative affective reactions were related to a range of external attributions (i.e., others 
causing the pay change).  
 
4.2 Pay System Change as an Affective Event: Affective Events Theory 
Affective Events Theory (AET) proposes that employees react to events like changes in their 
pay affectively (i.e., emotionally), which can partly explain why they adopt certain attitudes 
and behaviors (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). AET argues that the impact of work events on 
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attitudes and behaviors is underestimated because the influence, and even the existence, of 
affective reactions are often ignored. AET proposes that events that occur in our jobs can 
impact our affective states, which can then impact important work attitudes and behaviors. One 
of the core arguments of AET that has received some empirical support (e.g., Fisher, 2002; 
Mignonac & Herrbach, 2004; Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski, & Bravo, 2007) is that affective 
reactions following a work event should mediate the relationship between work events and 
work-related attitudes and behaviors. 
Ledford and Heneman (2000) suggest that, although most organizational changes can produce 
affective reactions in employees, changes in one’s compensation seem to be especially subject 
to affective reactions. Pay is an emotional issue and has direct consequences for employees’ 
self-esteem (Lawler, 1981). A complete pay-system change will likely alter one’s 
psychological contract at work (Rousseau, 2004), and is likely viewed as an important event 
which will elicit affective reactions among employees. Indeed, some recent research has 
demonstrated that employees’ tendency to experience negative and positive affect have an 
effect on how they react to pay changes (e.g. Begley & Lee, 2005; Shaw, Duffy, Jenkins, & 
Gupta, 1999; Shaw, Duffy, Mitra, Lockhart, & Bowler, 2003). Researchers, though, have yet to 
explore whether affective reactions to a pay reform explain employee behaviors and attitudes.  
RQ 2: How does a pay reform influence employee behaviors and attitudes? 
In the second article (Appendix II), we examined a situation where a new pay system partly 
based on performance appraisal replaced a pay system based on seniority and job titles. The 
“laws of emotion” (Frijda, 1988) state that the amount of positive and negative affect activated 
would depend on the individual employee outcome from the pay system change. Even though 
individual and contextual differences with respect to how meaningful money is to people exist 
(Mitchell & Mickel, 1999), the results of the study demonstrate that employees perceived a pay 
guarantee as a negative event while they considered a pay increase a positive event. Thus, the 
pay system elicited equal amounts of positive and negative affect, depending on the direction 
and amount of change in an individual’s pay. In a mood-congruent manner, positive affective 
reactions were related to high levels of effort, positive work behaviors and organizational 
commitment. However, the results on negative affective reactions were not as straightforward. 
Negative affective reactions were associated with lower levels of effort on the job, but also 
notably higher levels of positive work behaviors directed at improving the work environment.  
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Overall, the results of the second article suggest that: 
1) Employees react emotionally to pay changes, partly depending on the direction and 
amount of their pay change. 
2) Affective reactions are an important underlying mechanism to help explain why a pay 
system change may influence employee behaviors and attitudes. 
 
4.3 Managers Generating Meaning for Pay: Reflection Theory 
Pay satisfaction is the most common concept when compensation attitudes are discussed (H. G. 
I. Heneman & Judge, 2000). Research shows that if an employee is unsatisfied with his/her 
pay, undesirable outcomes follow (H. G. I. Heneman & Judge, 2000). In addition to the 
absolute amount of pay, relative comparisons contribute to pay satisfaction (see the meta-
analysis by Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006). Research on pay satisfaction has been 
dominated by equity theory (Adams, 1965) and discrepancy theory (Lawler, 1971, 1981) 
according to which employees’ pay satisfaction results from the judgments they make on 
whether their pay is proportionate to their inputs and those of fellow workers, and what they 
think they should receive. In addition, research on organizational justice has shown that 
employees care about the perceived fairness of the procedures used to distribute pay, especially 
when outcomes are low, such as with a low pay increase (Greenberg, 1987). Clearly, the pay 
distribution process matters, as does communication on how decisions are made, over and 
above payment amount per se (see also (Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1990, 1993).  
Reflection theory was developed to address shortcomings in understanding why pay is 
meaningful to an individual organization member (Thierry, 1998, 2001). Thierry (2001, p. 150) 
argues that “almost all theories fail to clarify which kind of meanings pay may have for that 
member.” For most people, pay not only buys necessities but has important symbolic value 
(Mitchell & Mickel, 1999). Reflection theory suggests that pay gives the employee a mirror 
that reflects images of status, power, value and succession. The theory proposes that the 
meaning pay holds for an individual can be largely deduced from his/her personal 
characteristics (such as values), pay level (relative to others), the person’s familiarity with the 
pay system (i.e., pay system knowledge) and pay system implementation practices and 
procedures. The way employees experience the meaning of the pay system is related to 
important employee outcomes, such as satisfaction, motivation and performance. Thus, 
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according to Thierry’s model, pay level and its delivery processes are assumed to affect 
employee attitudes such as pay satisfaction through (and because of) the meanings attached to 
it. Researchers have conducted few empirical studies on the core arguments of reflection theory 
(Thierry, 2001). Most of the literature on the theory is conceptual, and focuses on establishing 
the dimensionality of meanings of pay: motivational properties, relative position, control and 
spending.  
RQ 3: What are the psychological mechanisms that explain employee pay satisfaction? 
Study 3 (Appendix III) and study 4 (Appendix IV) complement others on the importance of 
transparency in pay system communications (R. L. Heneman, Mulvey, & LeBlanc, 2002; 
Mulvey, Le Blanc, Heneman, & McInerney, 2002; Sweins & Kalmi, 2008), which have shown 
that the better the information employees have on what to expect, the more realistic their 
expectations about pay. However, it is possible that an employee may know the system in 
general but not understand how it functions for him or herself specifically—and thus the pay 
system is not perceived as meaningful. The meanings of pay in these studies (Thierry, 1998; 
2001) add to our understanding of employee satisfaction with pay. Study 3 demonstrates that 
the meanings can be both instrumental and symbolic, as reflection theory suggests.  
In summary, the results suggest that: 
1) The better the employees know how their pay system functions (i.e., the higher the 
knowledge of pay), the more satisfied they are with it, and the more effective the pay 
system is deemed. 
2) The way employees interpret the pay system process (i.e., the meanings of pay) 
determines whether they are satisfied with the system and whether they consider the 
system effective. 
RQ 4: How can managers contribute to employees’ perceptions of merit pay system 
success? 
Study 4 (Appendix IV) relied primarily on reflection theory (Thierry, 1998; 2001) to argue that 
by paying attention to the messages they send when implementing a pay system, organizations 
can improve employees’ satisfaction with pay and even make the system more effective in 
serving organization goals. Managers can influence pay system success (i.e., acceptance and 
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effectiveness) by linking pay to performance and giving feedback on personal work 
achievement. Employee familiarity with the pay system, meanings of pay, and fairness of 
performance appraisal procedures mediated managerial actions on pay system success. More 
specifically, the results suggest that:  
1) The supervisory goal-setting process is related to pay system success only to the extent 
it helps employees understand the functions of the pay system and when the process 
was perceived as meaningful by employees in understanding what is valued at work. 
2) If employees trusted their managers, they were very likely to perceive that the 
performance appraisal procedure was fair, which was related to pay satisfaction but not 
to pay system effectiveness.  
Overall, studies 3 and 4 both provide a partial test to reflection theory, which suggests that pay 
level and the delivery processes have an effect on pay system acceptance and effectiveness 
through the meanings employees attach to them.  
 
4.4 Politics and Fairness: Social Exchange Perspective on Merit Pay Effectiveness 
Politics can have widespread effects on the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations 
through such procedures as performance appraisal, resource allocation, and managerial 
decision-making. Performance appraisal can be considered a political behavior (Tziner, 
Latham, Price, & Haccoun, 1996). In addition, employees can believe that politics play a role in 
how pay raises are determined (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Kacmar & Carlson, 1997). The vast 
majority of research on organizational politics views it as a negative phenomenon causing 
negative, anxiety-provoking reactions (for a review, see Kacmar & Baron, 1999). However, 
some scholars have noted that politics is probably necessary for the survival of organizations 
and its employees (e.g., Ammetera, Douglas, Gardnera, Hochwarterb, & Ferris, 2002; Pfeffer, 
1981). Accordingly, the aims of organizational politics are: (a) to protect and/or enhance an 
individual’s self-interests, and/or (b) to further the interests or goals of another person or group 
(Altman, Valenzi, & Hodgetts, 1985). 
While research has demonstrated empirically that politics and fairness are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, but are separate constructs (Andrews & Kacmar, 2001), little research has 
examined which one is more relevant (Aryee, Chen, & Budhwarc, 2004) or whether they 
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interact in predicting outcomes such as job performance, citizenship behavior, job satisfaction, 
and turnover intentions (e.g., Byrne, 2005; K. J. Harris, Andrews, & Kacmar, 2007). This 
literature draws from social exchange theory that considers feelings of reciprocity to be at the 
core of employment relationships (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Social exchange 
relationships develop between two parties through a series of mutual, although not necessarily 
concurrent, exchanges that yield a pattern of reciprocal obligations (Blau, 1964). Workers 
provide their talents and motivation to earn, in return, pay and power (Randall, Cropanzano, 
Bormann, & Birjulin, 1999). Merit pay systems can be considered an organizational 
intervention that simulates a social marketplace, where individuals engage in transactions to 
generate a favorable return on their investment. Researchers, though, have yet to explore 
whether perceptions of politics and fairness are antithetical, or whether the impact of one 
depends on the other in determining merit pay effectiveness. 
RQ 5: What makes people believe (or not believe) that a merit pay system is effective? 
The final study (Appendix V) proposes that even though generally high levels of politics in 
merit pay systems are associated with perceptions of an ineffective pay system, some forms of 
politics may not be as detrimental as others. A high level of favoritism in performance 
appraisals was related to low levels of pay system effectiveness, as expected. We expected that 
compression of performance appraisal scores (in anticipation of preserving group climate or 
encouraging future performance) would be perceived as effective since it might be considered 
as furthering individual or group interests (Altman, Valenzi, & Hodgetts, 1985). While we did 
not find support for this contention, we found that compression in performance appraisal was 
not perceived as having a negative impact on pay system effectiveness either.  
The most important goal of our study was to answer the call by Ferris et al. (1995) to explore 
the conditions under which politics and fairness can be considered antithetical (i.e., politics as a 
form of bias, a violation of the justice rules), and when they are interactively associated with 
outcomes. Our study agrees with previous research that organizational politics and fairness are 
distinct constructs (Andrews & Kacmar, 2001; Aryee, Chen, & Budhwarc, 2004) that interact 
in predicting social exchange outcomes (Byrne, 2005; K. J. Harris, Andrews, & Kacmar, 2007). 
Our results suggest that organizational politics and distributive justice are distinctively 
associated with whether a pay system motivates employees to achieve organizational goals. In a 
high politics environment, the pay system effectiveness also varied as a function of the level of 
distributive justice. However, voice in pay system development (a form of, or prerequisite for, 
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procedural justice) did not buffer the negative effect of politics on pay system effectiveness as 
we predicted. Instead, it only mattered when there was a low level of politics.  
Taken as a whole, our results suggest that politics and fairness distinctively and interactively 
related to employee perceptions of pay system effectiveness. More specifically: 
1) If employees perceive their pay as fair compared to their effort and other factors, they 
consider the system effective. But if they perceive performance appraisals as based on 
favoritism, and pay decisions based on politics rather than performance, they are likely 
to perceive the system as ineffective. Further, it is likely to produce negative, 
unintended outcomes. 
2) When employees perceive ratings being compressed in anticipation of evenly 
distributed pay raises, they consider this neutral, neither negative nor positive. 
3) In a highly political environment, the negative effect of politics on pay system 
effectiveness is neutralized for those employees who “win” (still think their pay is fair).  
4) Employee participation in pay system development may produce positive outcomes 
only in an environment with minimal politics.  
The results of our final article (Appendix V) suggest that the merit pay systems adopted were 
not ineffective or detrimental per se. Their effectiveness varied as a function of the established 
‘political’ and ‘fairness’ climates (Treadway, Adams, & Goodman, 2005) at different levels of 
the organization. 
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5. Discussion 
In this section, I discuss the main theoretical and practical contributions of this research, 
followed by the limitations and underlying assumptions. 
 
5.1 Psychological Mechanisms: Theoretical Contributions and Propositions 
This dissertation focuses on the psychological mechanisms that attempt to explain merit pay 
acceptance and effectiveness. We can understand more about the attitudes and behaviors of the 
existing workforce (i.e., incentive effects) by examining psychological mechanisms as reflected 
in just noticeable differences in pay changes, affective reactions to pay changes, and meanings 
of pay as well as employee perceptions of politics and fairness. Chart 2 shows the conceptual 
framework that underpins the dissertation, grounded in different theoretical perspectives.  
 
Acceptance
Pay level
Pay changes
Knowledge and 
meanings of pay
Affective reactions 
to pay system 
change
Perceptions of 
politics and fairness
Pay satisfaction
Effort on the job
Organizational 
Commitment
Positive 
work behaviors
Perceptions of 
pay system 
effectiveness
Effectiveness
Employee 
behaviors
and 
attitudes
Organizational 
goal attainment
Merit pay 
outcome
Psychological
mechanisms
Just 
noticeable
differences
 
Chart 2. The conceptual framework studied in the dissertation research 
 
The main challenges with merit pay, as I suggested in the introduction, relate to the acceptance 
and effectiveness of the pay system. The dissertation looked at different factors that explain 
why employees adopt certain attitudes and behavioral responses to merit pay reforms.  
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The five studies in this dissertation approach the subject from different theoretical perspectives, 
summarized below: 
• Aligned with the literature on just noticeable differences (Mitra et al., 1997) that draws 
from psychophysics, there is a relatively stable threshold below which pay changes go 
essentially unnoticed. For negative pay changes this threshold is smaller than for positive 
changes as prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) predicts.  
• Affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) proposes that affective reactions 
partly explain the effects of an important event, such as a pay reform, on employee 
attitudes and behaviors. Thus, positive pay changes such as pay increases elicit positive 
affective reactions and negative pay changes such as guaranteed pay elicit negative 
affective reactions. These affective reactions partly explain the unanticipated and desired 
consequences from a pay system change (such as job effort, positive work behaviors, and 
organizational commitment).   
• As reflection theory (Thierry, 2001) predicts, the effect of pay level and pay changes on 
merit pay acceptance and effectiveness is mediated through meanings of pay. Thus, the 
degree to which the pay system communicates symbolic and instrumental values 
important to the employee can explain how pay outcomes translate to pay satisfaction and 
pay system effectiveness.  
• Based on social exchange theory, a merit pay system can be considered an organizational 
intervention that simulates a social marketplace, where individuals make transactions to 
obtain a favorable return on their investment (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Employees 
make sense of the different forms of (or motives for) organizational politics that cause 
inaccuracy in the merit pay process arising from performance appraisals (Tziner, Latham, 
Price, & Haccoun, 1996) and pay decisions (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Kacmar & Carlson, 
1997). Some of these inaccuracies are more acceptable than others. Perceptions of 
organizational politics and fairness are interactively associated with how effective the pay 
system is deemed.  
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Future research should explore and integrate the different theoretical perspectives more 
broadly, including aspects of just noticeable differences, affective events theory, reflection 
theory, and theorizing on politics and fairness. In the meanwhile, I propose the following: 
Proposition 1: The level of just noticeable differences will depend on employees’ attributions 
of the cause for pay changes. In environments where pay cuts are necessary, there will be a 
lower level of negative affective reactions to pay cuts and employees may be less sensitive to 
pay cuts. My study 1 (Appendix I) cannot verify this contention since it was conducted in a 
setting where about a third of the employees received implied pay cuts while most others 
received increases. 
Proposition 2: Literature on affect (Frijda, 1988) suggests that the degree of affective reactions 
will erode over time as people get used to changes in their environment. It also suggests that 
negative affect will persist longer than positive. I add that whether the effect of initial reactions 
will be evident in work-related attitudes and behaviors over the long term depends on the level 
of perceived politics and fairness in pay distributions. In a situation where an employee first 
reacted positively to a pay change (probably a positive one), a higher level of organizational 
commitment might be ongoing only if the employee subsequently believes that pay is 
distributed fairly and not based on politics.  
Proposition 3: A pay system can transmit both positive and negative messages relevant for an 
employee’s self-image. I suggest that an employee can receive constructive feedback on 
performance via merit pay (i.e., reflecting positive meanings) yet feel controlled by the merit 
pay system (i.e., reflecting negative meanings). The positive meanings increase pay 
satisfaction, but the negative connotations may increase the level of stress at the same time. 
Future researchers should study these positive and negative reactions together, taking into 
account that employees receiving low pay-for-performance may consider the system 
controlling while higher-paid employees find it supportive (McCausland, Pouliakas, & 
Theodossiou, 2005). 
Proposition 4: I propose two factors that might explain why some employees found a newly 
implemented merit pay system effective even when there is a high level of organizational 
politics (according to the results of study 5). First, these employees may have ‘played’ the 
political game and won raises due to astute political behavior (i.e., political skill and political 
behaviors might be unmeasured factors that explain the relationship). Second, these employees 
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may believe they earned their ‘maximum’ under the previous pay system (due to seniority, for 
example), and are relatively happy with their current compensation when they see others 
struggle under the new merit pay system. 
Proposition 5: I propose that merit pay system acceptance and effectiveness are related. Those 
employees who are happy with their pay and the pay system are likely to behave in ways that 
are beneficial for the organization (i.e., demonstration of an incentive effect). However, the 
association between acceptance and effectiveness is far from straightforward due to at least two 
reasons: First, as discussed earlier in the introduction section, the organization may reward for 
A while hoping for B (Kerr, 1995). Second, a pay system can result in higher level of 
organizational performance even though not all employees are happy with it. This occurs, for 
instance, when discontented, low-performing employees quit (i.e., demonstration of a sorting 
effect). 
Next, I discuss the differences and similarities between factors that constitute merit pay 
acceptance and effectiveness in broader terms. 
 
5.2 Merit Pay Acceptance and Effectiveness: One and Same or Different? 
In this section, I discuss how existing research informs three central questions related to merit 
pay acceptance and effectiveness. 
Can employers promote the acceptability of their pay systems via distributing more pay to their 
employees? Previous research on pay satisfaction has shown a consistent but quite weak 
correlation between pay increases and pay satisfaction (r = .08: Williams, McDaniel, & 
Nguyen, 2006). The correlation, though, is substantially higher between pay level and pay 
satisfaction (r = .29: Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006), in line with the idea that 
subjective well-being depends more on the frequency of positive events than on their intensity 
(Diener, Sandvik, & Pavot, 1991). If the research took into account the possibly nonlinear 
relationship between pay and pay satisfaction, the association might be even higher (R. L. 
Heneman, Porter, Greenberger, & Strasser, 1997). The previous research suggests that base pay 
can be more effective in influencing attitudes and behaviors than recent pay changes (Gardner, 
van Dyne, & Pierce, 2004) or variable pay (Igalens & Roussel, 1999). A study that compared 
the effect of base pay level and bonuses (Worley, Bowen, & Lawler, 1992) supports this 
notion. Base pay levels, but not bonuses, were positively related to work performance and 
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affective commitment. However, merit increases that become a fixed part of base pay are often 
criticized as promoting an entitlement culture (R. L. Heneman & Gresham, 1998).  
Is it realistic to think that a merit pay practice will satisfy all employees? As Heneman (1992) 
notes, merit practice outcomes are unlikely to be completely positive or negative. A more likely 
scenario is that a merit pay plan succeeds along some lines but not others. There is also a 
practical question of whether merit pay can be acceptable and effective for all employee groups 
of the organization. For example, a little less than one third of the employees in the first study 
sample (Appendix I) received a pay increase at the threshold or higher for just noticeable 
difference. They would then probably have a positive affective reaction and report higher job 
effort. For the remaining employees, merit pay was not likely to elicit positive outcomes.  
Many individual pay-for-performance systems are zero-sum systems where larger raises or 
bonuses to some employees decrease the likelihood that a given individual will receive a large 
reward. For this reason, expectation-enhancing human resource practices such as pay-for-
performance practices are related to higher quit rates. But further analysis shows that this 
occurs mainly among poor performers (Shaw, Dineen, Fang, & Vellella, in press). Not all 
turnover is harmful to organizational effectiveness (Lawler, 1981, p. 16). Organizations can 
afford to lose some individuals and may actually benefit from losing poor performers. In other 
cases, it may be easy to replace workers. Thus, turnover is a matter of rate, who leaves, and 
replacement cost. 
It might be unrealistic to expect all employees to accept a merit pay system or expect it to be 
effective in all circumstances. Perhaps all employees will never be happy with their pay? The 
reason may lie in part with social comparisons: employees can compare many different factors, 
and they generally select those that are unfavorable, resulting in dissatisfaction (e.g., Brown, 
2001; Scholl, Cooper, & McKenna, 1987; Shore, Tashchian, & Jourdan, 2006; Sweeney & 
McFarlin, 2005; Sweeney, McFarlin, & Inderrieden, 1990; Trevor & Wazeter, 2006). As Bartol 
and Locke (2000, pp.123-124) state: “Ideally, a compensation system will promote both 
productivity and satisfaction. Given that it is unlikely that any plan will ever satisfy all 
employees, the emphasis is the satisfaction of higher performers.” 
If employees are satisfied with the pay system, is it guaranteed to be effective? According to a 
recent meta-analysis, pay satisfaction is usually only weakly related to work performance (r = 
.03, see Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006). However, the authors of the meta-analysis 
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state that the reason for the weak correlation may be that contextually relevant performance 
criteria are omitted (p. 406). As goal-setting theory suggests, merit pay practices may be 
particularly effective in focusing employee efforts. Heneman (2000b) states that perhaps the 
biggest problems with existing merit pay programs is failure to tie them to the organization’s 
business strategy: “Employees often fail to see a link between merit pay and the 
accomplishment of business goals because no link is being made” (p. 450). Possibly for this 
reason merit pay seems to be consistently related to positive attitudes, but has not been 
consistently shown to be related to improved subsequent performance (Heneman, 1992, p. 
258). Also, a satisfied employee is not always the most productive one and vice versa (Fisher, 
2003). Consequently, multiple contextually-relevant outcomes (such as the goals of the reform 
and the acceptance of these reasons) should be used in evaluating merit pay to determine 
whether they are likely to succeed or fail.  
 
5.3 Practical Contributions 
The findings of the first study (Appendix I) have implications for organizations seeking to 
manage a pay budget. The results suggest that pay budgets should allow increases of at least 
eight percent. Below this threshold, employees did not react meaningfully to pay increases. The 
results also suggest that a pay guarantee is a negative event—even if it does not directly reduce 
the current pay of the employee. Organizations that adopt a pay guarantee following a pay 
system change may encounter adverse effects (such as a lower level of job effort).  
So how can managers contribute to the success of a merit pay system? The results of the third 
(Appendix III) and fourth papers (Appendix IV) offer similar insights on how managers can 
succeed in implementing an acceptable and effective system. The first study suggests that how 
managers are perceived to set goals, give feedback, and create a relationship of trust has an 
indirect impact on pay system success, as perceived by employees. Managers can influence 
both pay satisfaction and pay system effectiveness through communicating the functions of the 
pay system. As a practical matter, managers should hold discussions on personal goals with 
each employee and clarify how achieving certain goals relates to pay. Employees will then 
understand better what is expected of them and the implications for their pay. By giving 
feedback and acknowledging employee work achievements, managers can influence the 
messages the pay system conveys. When employees trust their supervisors, they believe they 
will give fair performance appraisals.  
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However, managers may fail to link the pay system to organizational goals because politics 
may figure in pay decisions. The results of the final study (Appendix V) demonstrate that the 
higher the levels of politics employees perceived in pay decision-making, the less effective they 
perceived the pay system in achieving its objectives. A high level of supervisory favoritism in 
performance appraisals was also related to low levels of perceived pay system effectiveness. 
Both these forms of organizational politics were perceived as distorting the effectiveness of the 
pay system by the employees. In fact, the pay system was perceived to have increasingly 
negative, unanticipated effects in these cases. One form of organizational politics—
compressing performance ratings in anticipation of evenly distributed pay raises—was not, 
however, perceived as ineffective. According to the results, compression, often a guideline in 
Finnish public sector organizations, is not perceived as effective either. Employee participation 
in pay system development was positively associated with pay system effectiveness only in a 
low- politics environment.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that when organizations implement merit pay, they might want to 
consider the following factors: 
• Pay system change may have emotional impact on employees depending in part on their 
personal outcome. Pay increases below eight percent may be relatively insignificant to 
employees. However, employees will probably be comparatively more sensitive to a 
negative pay change (such as a pay guarantee) than a pay increase. This means that 
employees are proportionally more disappointed by negative changes in their pay than 
they are happy with pay increases. 
• Companies should invest in pay system communications to make sure employees and 
managers understand and approve the system’s goals and how to achieve them. 
Employee participation in pay system development is likely to have a positive impact 
on pay system effectiveness (if it is considered sincere). 
• Managers can promote the meaning of the pay system to employees via individualized 
and participatory goal-setting processes that provides feedback on performance. It is 
important to clarify how pay can and should be linked to performance on the individual 
level. 
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• Managers should avoid politics, especially in pay decisions that might distort the aims 
of the pay system. However, achieving objective performance appraisals may not be 
realistic. Employees are likely to judge and react to performance appraisal inaccuracy 
based on how they perceive the motives for the inaccuracy.  
 
Taking into account all the evidence from existing research, including the dissertation papers, 
tying pay to performance is desirable but difficult to achieve because of implementation 
challenges at the organizational and supervisory levels (see Chart 3). An assessment of the 
conditions that facilitate or hinder the use of merit pay needs to be made. The main challenges 
with merit pay relate performance appraisals, pay budgets and pay decisions (Campbell, 
Campbell, & Chia, 1998; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Perry, Engbers, & Jun, 2008). I would expect 
that organizational context, including economic conditions, institutional environment, and the 
kinds of jobs employees hold, are important predictors of how prevalent each of these 
challenges is in practice (for a discussion on situational constraints, see R. L. Heneman & 
Werner, 2006, pp. 57-92).  
 
Performance
criteria 
Merit pay implementation
Pay decisions
Goals of the pay
system Goal setting
Performance
appraisal
and feedback
Merit increase
constraints
Mission and strategy
of the organization
Administrative
challenges
Goals unclear, conflicted,
or unacceptable because 
employees did not have a say
Criteria not possible to 
appraise or not related
to relevant performance
Budget does not
allow rewarding for
good performance
(increases too small for
high performers)
Decisions political,
or do not distinguish between
low and high performers
(increases evenly distributed) 
Communication
Not clear why there was or
was not a change in pay 
Goals vague, conflicted,
or unacceptable
Performance appraisal 
not perceived as fair
Not discussed how pay 
and performance are linked
Individual job Relevant job performance 
not measurable or observable
Managerial
challenges
Merit pay budget
 
Chart 3. Possible challenges with merit pay implementation (Note: dissertation conclusions 
depicted in italics) 
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Strategic pay framework suggests that best results emerge when compensation practices are 
aligned tightly with organizational strategies. As R.L. Heneman (2000b) argues, compensation 
goals must be linked to business strategy and specific enough to focus employee efforts on the 
organization’s long-term objectives (i.e., shifting the focus from rewarding past achievements 
to future requirements). This may be more easily said than done with merit pay since the 
criteria for a merit pay practice can be tedious to accommodate as the conditions change. Merit 
pay practices generally work best in relatively stable organizations where favorable economic 
and institutional conditions allow an adequate pay budget (R. L. Heneman & Werner, 2006, pp. 
57-92). Further, job characteristics need to be well-defined, and employees should ideally have 
a high level of discretion in performing their (independent) work. The organizations where 
merit pay systems work well are likely to have streamlined structures with clear supervisory 
relationships. If supervisors can know well ahead of time about pay budget frameworks, this 
can help them set goals and clarify expectations concerning payouts.  
Managerial challenges are fundamentally related to the kinds of jobs their employees perform. 
Task performance outcomes need to be visible, and/or there need to be other ways of gathering 
performance information (such as from customers). Merit pay may be hard to sustain if 
supervisors cannot draw firm conclusions about individual performance in interdependent work 
contexts, such as when work is organized into teams (for example, see Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 
2002). Supervisory training is often suggested as a way to promote performance appraisal 
objectivity (Campbell, Campbell, & Chia, 1998). However, as Bartol and Martin (1988; 1990) 
show, managers may distort the “objectivity” of the pay system for legitimate reasons such as 
retaining key employees. Also, even though supervisors may know how to differentiate among 
employees, they tend to consider the broader effects of rewards on group harmony, as an 
example (Giacobbe-Miller, Miller, & Victorov, 1998). Thus, organizations need to consider 
how feasible it is to trust supervisory judgment and decentralize pay decision-making, and 
where unified higher-level consideration is needed.  
Research that compares merit pay administrative and managerial challenges to those of 
alternative reward systems such as incentive plans, promotions, and nonmonetary rewards in 
different organizational contexts can advance our knowledge in this area.  
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5.4 Limitations 
This dissertation adds to our understanding of how employees react to pay systems, especially 
merit pay plans. I discuss the limitations in each of the individual research papers in detail. 
Here I will describe them from a broader perspective. 
The theoretical concepts need to be carefully operationalized to achieve good validity and 
reliability. Because the concepts have been operationalized by using multiple-choice questions, 
the options are narrowed and the scale for answers predetermined.  For example, in examining 
the meanings of pay, only positive meanings have been considered in the current 
operationalization of the reflection theory. It is thus possible that the meaning of pay in the 
organization we studied was not neutral but primarily negative. Our research approach would 
not have captured this factor. Similarly, only certain aspects of political behavior related to pay-
for-performance were measured. The decisions about compensable factors and sub-factors, 
timing of assessments and reassessments, and internal or external equity (Gupta & Jenkins, 
1996) are factors to consider in future studies. The measure of affective reactions captured only 
the active spectrum of affective reactions (i.e., positive activation and negative activation). 
These choices are a major restriction with this hypothetic-deductive approach, which relies on 
theories and concepts that are predefined (and traditionally operationalized in a certain 
fashion).  
According to the positivistic orientation, the data should be systematically gathered from the 
theoretical framework to achieve objectivity. One could ask whether the individual-level 
approach is useful to appraise the effects. Employees may be good informants of their own 
attitudes, such as organizational commitment (Goffin & Gellatly, 2001) but they may not be the 
best informants with regard to their behavior, especially their performance (M. M. Harris & 
Schaubroeck, 1988) or attaining organization-wide goals. The broader issue is whether 
employee attitudes and behaviors matter in organizational settings. One could ask whether 
there is any hard data linking employee perceptions of merit pay with, for example, firm 
performance or productivity. We know from the literature that, at least on the individual level, 
employee attitudes predict job performance. This was demonstrated in a recent meta-analysis 
where overall job attitudes reflecting organizational commitment and job satisfaction strongly 
predicted (r = .59) how engaged a person was with his/her job (Harrison, Newman, & Roth, 
2006). The researchers used a composite of multiple job performance measures. Also on the 
unit level, aggregate job satisfaction and employee engagement are significantly related to 
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business unit performance (r = .37-.38) (Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002). These meta-analyses 
suggest that employee attitudes have relevance. However, there is still only sparse longitudinal 
research that explores whether attitudes affect performance or vice versa. Some recent research 
has shown that the relationship between pay satisfaction and financial performance might be 
reciprocal (Schneider, Hanges, Smith, & Salvaggio, 2003). Thus, when economic conditions 
are good, employees often receive higher pay, which satisfies them. This satisfaction promotes 
higher effort and performance. Longitudinal research combining data from different levels of 
the organizations would be valuable. At the organizational level, both success and survival of 
the plans should be assessed (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003, p. 195). 
Our reliance on a single survey is of concern. Since our independent and dependent attitudinal 
variables were measured within the same survey, our findings may be influenced by common 
method bias by creating artificial correlation between the variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). To help reduce this possibility, the following steps were taken in the 
survey design and administration. First, information about the double blind data gathering 
procedure was communicated to everyone to reduce social desirability. Second, pilot tests were 
conducted to reduce survey item ambiguity. Further, in some of the papers, we explicitly tested 
the effect of common method bias (by incorporating a method factor in the model) and did not 
find evidence that it would significantly impact our results. Nevertheless, it remains a potential 
issue. Common method bias, we should mention, is not a concern when it comes to testing 
interactions. Research has shown that artificial interaction cannot be created by common 
method variance (Evans, 1985). Instead, true interactions can be deflated. 
Many studies focus on employee attitudes either following a change in pay (i.e., measuring 
reactions shortly after a reform), or asking explicitly about their attitudes about the pay system 
(such as whether it is effective and they are satisfied with it). However, none of the studies can 
claim that these attitudes are a direct result of the pay reform, partly because of the possibility 
of common method variance explaining the results and partly because the research design was 
not longitudinal. The best way to study whether pay reforms change attitudes would be to 
conduct random experimental longitudinal studies with clear interventions and control groups 
(Stone-Romero & Rosopa, 2008). Then changes in attitudes can be measured as a function of 
the reform. For example, I argue in this dissertation that how managers implement pay systems 
affects employee satisfaction and the effectiveness of the system. However, this is only shown 
through measuring employee perceptions of their managers’ actions. Consequently, we cannot 
know whether training managers in performance management, or changing organizational 
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structure and managerial roles in pay system implementation, would make any difference in 
employee attitudes and behaviors. This would be an interesting avenue for future research.  
All five dissertation studies focused on individual-level phenomena and treated the employee 
samples as a relatively homogenous group (controlling for certain demographical factors). 
Since the studies did not differentiate between high- and low-performing employees, another 
concern of practical relevance arises: are the systems targeted to “key employee groups”? For 
example, if there is variation in the commitment of the employees, which ones are planning on 
leaving, the high- or low-performing employees? To what extent does employee turnover result 
from dissatisfaction with compensation system? While most research on the topic, including 
this dissertation, usually considers employees as a single entity, they are of course a 
heterogeneous group. Practitioners need to take this into account when they evaluate the 
success of their reforms. Organizations may want to attract, retain and motivate certain groups 
of employees. They would then determine the success of their pay systems based on their 
acceptability and effectiveness for these groups in particular. Also for this reason, we cannot 
infer from these studies whether the reforms succeeded in attracting and retaining a skilled 
workforce, or whether they definitively achieved other specific goals, per se.  
Finally, it is possible that some of the results are contextual and do not apply to other contexts. 
For instance, the notion of guaranteed pay is specific to the context we investigated. Two of the 
studies (Appendixes I and II) utilized this as an opportunity (which occurs infrequently), and 
one (Appendix V) only controlled for its existence (parceling out the possible effect of the 
phenomenon). Even if the results of dissertation research support the hypothesis about 
guaranteed pay as a negative affective event in the eyes of employees, the results for its effect 
on employee attitudes and behaviors were mixed. Is there a need for further theory 
development, or are these results just context-specific? According to an excellent review by 
Johns (2006), context can restrict range, affect base rates, change causal direction, reverse 
signs, prompt curvilinear effects, tip precarious relationships and threaten validity. Any new 
results should therefore be interpreted cautiously and further validated in another context to 
distinguish between universal and context-specific phenomena. 
 
To summarize, the major limitations of the dissertation research are: 
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• I adopted a hypothetic-deductive theory-testing approach and used previously validated 
survey measures to study theoretical concepts. This should enhance the reliability of the 
research (i.e., the degree to which the procedures can be repeated). However, few of 
these survey measures have been validated in the Finnish language. The studies have 
also relied on employees as sources of information on their own behaviors and the 
effectiveness of the pay practice. These methods present possible threats to the 
construct validity of the study (i.e., the appropriateness of the operational measures). 
• All results are subject to the possibility of common method bias and none of the studies 
capture changes in employee attitudes before and after a pay reform. Thus, we cannot 
infer from the data how the systems compare to other practices (such as the older ones) 
in motivating employees. None of the studies looks at whether interventions in 
implementation (such as training) would affect unit- or organizational-level 
performance. Given the reliance on cross-sectional data gathered mostly from one 
source, these aspects of the research pose potential threats to the internal validity of the 
research (i.e., the degree to which causal relationships can be established between 
constructs). 
• Since some aspects of the research context are unique (especially the contention of 
guaranteed pay, implied pay cuts), it may be difficult to fully distinguish between 
universal and context-specific phenomena. This poses a potential threat to the external 
validity of the research (i.e., the degree to which the results can be generalized to other 
contexts). 
 
Having noted the primary limitations of the dissertation research, I want to recall the basic 
premise of the research: did the studies produce interesting, theoretically and methodologically 
sound and novel information? I believe they did. The results should help us understand more 
about why employees react in certain ways to pay-for-performance practices. They also provide 
new information on the conditions under which pay-for-performance may be considered 
acceptable and effective by employees. Both of these contributions have theoretical and 
practical relevance. However, we must bear in mind the limitations noted above in interpreting 
these results. 
 
38 Psychological mechanisms explaining merit pay acceptance and effectiveness 
6. Future Directions  
The psychological mechanisms studied in this dissertation describe the conditions under which 
merit pay plans will be acceptable and effective, and why. These studies underscore the 
importance of not assuming that adopting a pay-for-performance philosophy will always lead to 
a successful pay-for-performance practice and positive employee perceptions.  
How can academic research help organizations overcome the dilemma that lies at the core of 
the merit pay practice? Research suggests that merit pay is hard to implement but if employees 
do not believe their compensation systems are equitable, the organization risks wasting money 
and losing high performers. In my view, compensation research has not focused sufficiently on 
what organizations and managers face in putting a new pay system into practice. For example, 
Bartol and Locke (2000) acknowledge that implementing equity is much harder than 
enumerating general principles. But they offer no specific guidelines, except to say that “the 
plan is [/should be] implemented in a fair and objective manner” (p.124). Research on 
procedural justice has demonstrated that communication and employee participation are critical 
(Konovsky, 2000), and managers can buffer the negative effect of underpayment by treating 
employees fairly (Greenberg, 2006). Overall, however, there is relatively little (multilevel) 
research on the intervening processes between merit pay policy and organizational 
effectiveness (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, pp. 260-261). This is one of the major challenges to 
compensation research and theory development, in my view. 
Finally, it is evident that even though most people work for money (and would not work if they 
did not receive compensation for their efforts) monetary reward is only one part of why people 
join and remain with an organization and perform well. There are individual differences in how 
important money is for different people (e.g. Tang, Tang, & Luna-Arocas, 2005) and they may 
trade off  money in return for such rewards as interesting work, opportunities for growth, 
outstanding leadership, benefits, job security, stimulating colleagues and convenient location or 
working conditions (Bartol & Locke, 2000). Lawler (1981) argues, however, that intrinsic and 
extrinsic rewards are not directly substitutable because they satisfy somewhat different needs: 
“Money will not make up for a boring, repetitive job just an interesting job will not make up for 
low pay” (p. 15). As Gerhart and Rynes (2003, p. 262) note, we need a more refined 
understanding of the most efficient investment of total resources in attracting the right people to 
an organization and then motivating and retaining them. 
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